The Attorney General and the Rule of Law

Date: Dec 30 2004

Sent to but not published in New York Times

Andrew Rosenthal (op ed, December 30th 2004) has it right. The nomination of Alberto Gonzales to the position of Attorney General is an insult to the rule of law. As White House Counsel, Mr. Gonzales, together with civilian lawyers in the service departments, was instrumental in devising rules that permitted torture (maybe it was soft torture, but it was torture nonetheless) of prisoners held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq.
The policy advocated by these civil lawyers is stupendously stupid. The military lawyers are correct in opposing the policy because of the impact on the treatment of American prisoners in foreign hands. The injunction of “do as you would be done by” is a precious one to adhere to in military conduct. The US’s abandonment of this rule will serve it ill.
One step to righting this injustice would be for President Bush to withdraw this nomination. Failing that, the Senate should reject his confirmation.

Post War Credits

Post War Credits Martin G. Evans Professor Emeritus, Rotman School of Management University of Toronto The cost of the Second Iraq War is inexorably increasing. At the last count the financial cost is approaching $150 billion. We must pay for this war ourselves. It would be immoral and irresponsible to pass the cost of the war on to our children and grandchildren. The question is how to pay for it. In 1940 John Maynard Keynes published a small monograph entitled “How to pay for the war.” Later that year, the British Government incorporated some of his ideas into the Post War Credits scheme. This involved a forced saving deduction from an individual’s income; the savings were to be paid back after the war – in fact they only began to be paid back on a person’s retirement and people were still receiving post war credits as late as 1973 – almost thirty years after the war had ended. I suggest that the U.S. adopt a similar scheme – it has the advantage of paying for the war in the short term and creating individual retirement savings accounts in the longer term, which is a priority of the present Administration. A progressive forced loan of the form outlined in the Table would generate about $128 billion dollars a year – enough to put a big dent in the Iraq war’s cost. The scheme I propose here would be steeply progressive with the surcharge beginning at an income of $60,000. All income over $60,000 would be subject to a forced loan rate of 1%, an additional 1% would be charged on income over $100,000. After each increment of $50,000, there would be an additional 1% surcharge though the rate would even out at 16% of the portion of a person’s income over $500,000. This represents about a 1% increase in withholding at the lowest level but represents about a 45% increase in withholding for the millionaires among us. Income Forced loan rate. Additional withholding from income. under $60,000 0.0 % $0.00 $60,000 to $100,000 1.0 % 0 to $400 $100,000 to $150,000 2.0 % $400 to $1,400 $150,000 to $200,000 3.0% $1,400 to $2,400 $200,000 to $250,000 4.5 % $2,400 to $5,150 $250,000 to $300,000 6.0 % $5,150 to $8,150 $300,000 to $350,000 7.5 % $8,150 to $11,510 $350,000 to $400,000 9.0 % $11,510 to $14,150 $400,000 to $450,000 11.0 % $14,150 to $17,150 $450,000 to $500,000 13.0 % $17,150 to $28,400 $500,000 to $1,000,000 16.0 % $28,400 to $ 108,400 $1,000,000 to $2,000,000, etc 16.0 % $108,400 to $268,400, etc Alternative levels of withholding and different levels of progression could be administered if the scheme proposed here was thought to be too draconian. The important point is to get the war paid for by this generation. The funds in each individual’s loan account would accrue interest at the rate of 3%; this interest would accrue tax free in the individual’s account. At retirement, the account would be converted to an annuity with the repayment of the interest portion being taxable. This plan would ensure that the present generation paid the costs of its war and would have, as a bonus, the effect of generating retirement savings for the wealthier half of the country. Retirement funds for the poorer among us will have to await an administration more committed to the social safety net

Going to the Hogs

ate: November 3 2004
Sent to but not published by Boston Globe

The country is going to the hogs.

With the re-election of George W. Bush, the greedy business executives who looted their companies and the country have received a carte blanche. They are free to continue to pay wages below a living wage. They are free to offer jobs without health benefits though the benefits they receive are very nice, thank you. They can continue their drive to reduce regulations that are the protection of the public. They will be accountable to no one.

I lament for the nation.

Bush's Abdication of Responsibility

Date: October 27 2004
Sent to but not published by Boston Globe

George W. Bush's discovery of religion in his mid-40's has enabled him to disavow responsibility for his wild youthful misdemeanors. This is reasonable – no one should be faulted for their youthful mistakes.

But Bush and his administration have made the abdication of responsibility a way of life. Let us look at the tally.

As a Director of Harken Energy, George Bush abdicated his responsibility to the shareholders who were paying him by failing to file a timely "Insider Trading" report to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

As CEO of Halliburton, Cheney disclaimed responsibility for the aggressive accounting practices that have now been reversed following an SEC investigation.

In Iraq, Bush and his associates have abdicated responsibility for:

• the failure of intelligence that led to the beliefs that there were weapons of mass destruction under Saddam Hussein's control;
• the failure to plan for peace;
• the failure to abide by the Geneva Convention in the treatment of prisoners and detainees.
• the failure to guard anywhere, except the Oil Ministry, following the fall of Iraq.

At home, Bush and his associates have abdicated responsibility for:

• funding the "No Child Left Behind" Program;
• funding for the protection of the air we breathe and the water we drink;
• protecting the rights and freedoms of every American citizen.

With a record like that, why would anyone vote for a continuation of this administration?

Redistricting in Massachusetts

Date: October 21 2004
Sent to but not published by Boston Globe

The redistricting problems of Massachusetts have faded from memory. But unless we devise a better method of setting District boundaries, our troubles will come back at the beginning of the next decade. We need to think through an alternative to the Legislature devising the boundaries.
Think back to when you were a child, if a piece of cake had to be divided between you and a friend, you quickly figured out that the way to get a fair distribution was for one person to cut the piece of cake in half and for the second person to decide which piece to take. That kept the cutter honest and made sure that two equal pieces emerged.
It is not like that when it comes to choosing the boundaries of political districts in Massachusetts, the big brothers and sisters on Beacon Hill design and choose the boundaries – it is almost like the politicians choose the voters rather than, as it should be, the voters choosing their representatives. As a result Massachusetts has almost the least competitive election in the US. It is very clear that redistricting is much too important to be left to the politicians who act as the political heirs of Elbridge Gerry to create districts to suit their convenience.
There must be a better, fairer way of setting the boundaries of electoral districts. There are! Federalism is, after all, a source of experimentation so we can see a number of alternatives existing across different states.
My favorite would be for Massachusetts to adopt an independent electoral redistricting commission such as that found in Arizona. A committee of 5 persons is charged with undertaking the redistricting every ten years. Four of these are partisan (selected from a pool of 25 generated by the State Supreme Judicial Court) – but are NOT current, past or potential office holders. The four members then select a fifth. This small committee then designs one or more plans based on the usual criteria: equal numbers of voters, contiguity, compactness, community of interest, and adherence to the Voting Rights Act. One of these plans is then adopted by a simple majority vote. The boundaries are then binding on the electorate unless there is a court challenge. Any challenge would go directly to the State Supreme Judicial Court so as to ensure a speedy disposition of the case.
This process of designing the boundaries has the advantage of allowing politically motivated input to the system – through the selection of the commissioners – but keeps the politicians at arm's length when it comes to the design and decision. The least of many evils!
A quick look at the map of the current boundaries of the Massachusetts Congressional Districts shows that many of the current criteria are not met: districts do have roughly equal numbers, but they are not compact and they have little community of interest – what do the voters of preppie Needham have in common with the voters of blue-collar Fall River.
We are six years away from the next Census and the need for redistricting. If we start now, at the pace at which the political wheels turn in Massachusetts, we might have just the new procedures in place for 2001. But we have to get started NOW. If your district has a redistricting reform question on the ballot, I urge you to vote in favor to bring home to our legislators the importance of action.

Health care in the debate

Date: October 14 2004
Sent to but not published by Boston Globe

Mr Bush made a major misleading statement in the debate last evening when he said that "... government-run health will lead to poor quality health, will lead to rationing, will lead to less choice."

The fact is that the data show something very different. A useful indicator of the quality of health care is the infant mortality rate. In the US this is 6.6 deaths per 1000 live births. In Canada where health care is run by the provinces, the rate is 4.8 deaths per 1000 live births. In the UK where the central government pays for health care, the rate is 5.2. In Scandinavia the rate ranges from 2.8 (Sweden) to 4.6 (Denmark).

The fact is that for some people, US health care is the best in the world; for others, it is totally inadequate. Rationing of health care in the US is accomplished by the ability to pay.

Abuse and Terrorists

Date: September 13th 2004
Sent to but not published by the Boston Globe

I am truly appalled by the words reportedly (Boston Globe, September 11, 2004) uttered by Donald Rumsfeld: that our treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib was better than the way the terrorists had treated their captives - death.

We will lose the war on terrorism if we select their behavior as the standard against which we judge our own. In the past, we have judged our behavior against the ideals set forth by our founders: a beacon set upon a hill, a country of laws not men.

Our judgements about the propriety of those actions should be based on their relation to the laws we swore to uphold: the Geneva Convention on prisoners' rights, the anti-torture treaties that the US has signed. That should be the standard, not the behavior of the terrorists.

In 2002 Secretary of State Powell justified the US's failure to sign the International Criminal Court Treaty because "We have the highest standards of accountability of any nation on earth." Today how hollow this statement sounds after the prison abuses of this past year and their consequences of courts martial being arranged for soldiers and wrist slaps for officers involved with the abuse; to say nothing of the lack of accountability for those in the higher echelons of government.

Forgetfulness of McCain and Collins

Date: September 9. 2004
Sent to but not published in the Boston Globe

Ben DeLorio had it right about Senator Susan Collins (Boston Globe, Sept 1.) and David Claffey (Boston Globe, Sept 2.) had it right about John McCain. Frankly I had expected better from these two moderate Republicans.
Collins forgot to mention that from October 2001 until June of 2002, President Bush soundly resisted the call for a Department of Homeland Security. It was only through pressure from the Democrats and especially from the families of those who perished in the 9/11 attacks that President Bush reluctantly adopted the idea in June of 2002.
McCain forgot to mention, in his exuberant defence of the Iraq war, that Saddam was in fact highly constrained because of the UN Sanctions on Iraq; the inspectors on the ground; and allied air patrols in the air
It just goes to show that in an election year, being Republican trumps everything; even the whole truth!

Recall George W. Bush to the Colors

Date: September 8, 2004
Sent to but not published by the Boston Globe

If G.W. Bush did, as your story (September 11, 2004) suggests, break his contract with the United States to undertake service in the National Guard; and if the consequence of breaking that contract are a recall to active duty; then I have a suggestion.
I understand that there is a shortage of troops in Iraq. Recalling G.W. Bush to the colors would seem to be poetic justice.
I understand he is a dab hand at food service. There is a Mess Hall in Iraq that could use his services.

Convention Truths

Date: September 3 2004
Sent to but not published by Washington Post

The Republican party Convention is becoming the convention of the big lie. So far the top performer has been erstwhile Democrat, Zell Miller. His list of weapons systems that John Kerry voted against were, in the main, weapons systems that Dick Cheney was also opposed to.

Never mind, the great American public will not notice that Cheney and Kerry were united on those issues. Only the lie that Kerry was soft on defence will be remembered

Close behind in the absurdity of his support for war was moderate republican Senator John McCain. He effused that we had to go to war because "We couldn't afford the risk posed by an unconstrained Saddam in these dangerous times." Unfortunately, Senator McCain overlooked the constraints imposed upon Saddam by the UN Sanctions, the arms inspectors who were on the ground (and finding nothing), and the allies who were patrolling Iraqi air space. Some freedom! With those constraints the necessity of war becomes quite questionable.

Our final example comes not from the convention itself but from some pre-convention advice given to the President by Senator Susan Collins writing in the Boston Globe. She claims that President Bush “called for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.” (Boston Globe, August 29, 2004). She conveniently forgets that from October 2001 until June of 2002, President Bush soundly resisted the call for a Department of Homeland Security. It was only through pressure from the Democrats and especially from the families of those who perished in the 9/11 attacks that President Bush reluctantly adopted the idea in June of 2002.

Really even a Massachusetts Democrat expects better of these distinguished Senators. In politics, as in war, the first casualty is the whole truth.

The hollowness of George W. Bush's values

Date: September 2, 2004
Sent to but not published in the Philadelphia Inquirer

The hollowness of George W. Bush's values.

A person who really acted on the values he espouses would long ago have disavowed the scurrilous slurs of the Swifties.
This is just one more disconnect between what George Bush says and what George Bush does. He promised us compassion; he delivered the most divisive administration in recent history with its opening up of the class war by stiffing the working stiff while giving untold wealth to the rich – yes a tax cut of $58,000 appears to be untold wealth to the working poor making an income of $15,000 a year; that is a tax cut of $58,000, not an income of $58,000!
He extols the sacrifices of the troops in the field while failing to fund the necessary Veterans' programs to support them in their post-battlefield traumas. He speaks with his hand on his heart of our debt to the first responders who are in the front line of our defenses against terrorism while he ruthlessly cuts transfer payments to states and cities who are unable to afford the cost of strengthening that security.
He talks of "no child left behind" but fails to provide adequate funding for the programs that would make that slogan a reality. For the first time in history, he wants to amend our constitution -- a document rich with the symbols of liberalism and freedom -- to discriminate against our fellow citizens. He talks of strengthening medicare but enacts legislation that allows the drug companies to enjoy excessive profits.
He talks about conservatism (which to me means conservation) but presides over an administration that repudiated the Kyoto accords, that has weakened clean air laws and that is opening up areas of the wilderness to being trampled on by off-road vehicles and oil and gas drilling rigs.
He talks about law and order but his legal advisors suggest repudiating the Geneva convention – a convention designed to protect American prisoners of war – and his agents abuse prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq.
He talks a good game, but I implore Americans to judge him by his actions and those of his administration.

John McCain's rationale for support of the Iraq War

ate: August 31, 2004
Sent to but not published by New York Times

At the Republican convention last evening (August 30), Senator John McCain said he supported President Bush's attack on Iraq because: "We couldn't afford the risk posed by an unconstrained Saddam in these dangerous times."
The Senator seems to have forgotten the situation on the ground just before the war began. First, Saddam was highly constrained because of the UN Sanctions on Iraq. Despite their problems, they had drastically reduced the potential for Saddam buying weapons materiel. Second, inspectors were on the ground in Iraq. Their reports suggested that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The eight months since Bush claimed victory have only confirmed their findings. No weapons have been found.
Would the Senator agree that Saddam was constrained? Would the Senator agree that, based on his own logic that the war was not justified?

Susan Collins' amnesia about DHS

Date: August 29th., 2004
Sent to but not published in the Boston Globe

I am surprised that Senator Susan Collins would exhibit such amnesia in her statement that President Bush “called for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.” (Boston Globe, August 29, 2004).
Let me refresh her memory. From October 2001 until June of 2002, President Bush soundly resisted the call for a Department of Homeland Security. It was only through pressure from the Democrats and especially from the families of those who perished in the 9/11 attacks that President Bush reluctantly embraced the idea in June of 2002.
The creation of that Department was by no means a Bush initiative!

PS
If you can't publish this letter -- and you just published one of mine -- I would ask you to call Susan Collins to account and have her publish a correction to this statement. Yet another political use of the "big lie."
As George H. W. Bush said during his campaign -- the lie is on the front page, the retraction is on the inside page; only the lie gets noticed.

Kerry Would Still Vote for War Authorization. Why?

Explaining Kerry's statement that he would still Vote for War Powers

Published in Boston Globe, August 23, 2004.

Ann Yurek (Globe, August 17 2004) says that Kerry wanted to trust the President so that is why he voted war making powers for the President (October 2002). But it really was not a question of trust; it was a vote designed to give the President leverage in calling Iraq to account before the United Nations. It exemplified realpolitik at its best.
It is hard to remember the sequence of events from 2001 and the present day. Up until November 2002 (that is until the President had the support of Senate and House) the Iraqis refused to allow UN inspectors to undertake inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction on Iraqi territory. By the end of November, Inspections under the direction of Hans Blix were under way. The vote to grant the President war powers had achieved its purpose, the Iraq regime was being called to account for its actions.
We have forgotten too that Hans Blix called on the US and Britain to give his inspectors the "hard intelligence" that they claimed to possess so that his inspectors could go to check out that information on the ground. The failure of the US and Britain to do so should have roused our suspicions that all was not well with the intelligence -- its invalidity has been amply demonstrated in the past six months.
Where we went wrong -- the Senate, and the House, and the country, and all of us -- was the failure to recognize the importance of the inspector's reports in mid February 2003 that there was no evidence of immanent danger from Iraq. That should have led to a re-evaluation of the war power resolution and its potential repeal based on the changed situation. We failed to do so and we are reaping the tragic consequences today.
So, unlike Ann Yurek, I cannot understand Kerry's statement that, even with the evidence that there were no weapons of mass destruction, he would still have voted to give war powers to the President. There is no realpolitik rationale, there is no National Security rationale, there is no counter-terrorism rationale. So why would he say that he would still vote for war? His saying that today makes no sense -- except as a cheap ploy to garner votes in the upcoming election.
See edited and published version here

Mr. Jacoby's cheap shots

Sent to and not published by the Boston Globe

Jeff Jacoby accuses John Kerry of taking a cheap shot at Attorney General Ashcroft (Boston Globe, Friday July 30th.) Jacoby avers that Ashcroft is a staunch upholder of our constitutional rights.
Not so.
The metaphor for Ashcroft's tenure in the Justice Department was his clothing of the semi-nude classical statues in front of which he gave his news conferences. Ashcroft just did not realize that these were symbolic of the fact that justice must appear naked before the world. Justice must be done and justice must be seen to be done.
Here is the bill of indictment showing Ashcroft's failure to uphold the constitution:

1. The prisoners held incommunicado at Guantanamo Bay
2. The prisoners held incommunicado in the United States
3. The failure to uphold the treaty rights and legal rights of prisoners held in Iraq.

Is that enough for Mr. Jacoby?

Insulin: Another False Claim

Sent to and not published by the Boston Globe

Dear Editor:
I hate to rain on your parade, but you did it again: falsely claimed that Insulin was first used on patients in Boston. The claim was made in yesterdays "New Boston" section (page D10, sidebar: Medical Milestones).
I sent you this letter in April complaining of a similar claim made in your magazine. Once again you are contributing to the ignorance of your fellow citizens.
Here is my previous letter of April 20th. 2004:
"No wonder Americans are so ill informed about the rest of the world.
In an article in Sunday's magazine about a young medical student, you said that he came to Boston where "insulin was introduced."
This gives the impression that Americans discovered, purified, and first treated diabetics with insulin.
Wrong!
This was the achievement of Banting, Best and Collip at the University of Toronto in Canada.
Please contribute to better informed Americans by publishing a correction next week. Thank you".

Needless to say, you never published a correction.

Microsoft's Priorities

Sent to and not published by the Boston Globe

Now that the anti-trust suits have been settled and the risk of fines and damages are past, Microsoft's needs for a gigantic war chest are over.
I must confess that I, as a consumer, could see a better use for the funds than returning the money to the stockholders. How about investing in the product to stabilize it and get rid of all those undocumented holes in security that bedevil Windows to this day. Or how about paying Windows users for the downtime costs of adding security patches and data losses due to the viruses and worms that entered our systems due to Microsoft's inability to provide a secure platform.

handwashing in hospitals

Sent to and not published by the Boston Globe

So Nurses have no time to wash their hands between patients. Yet another sign of understaffing in our hospitals!

Which Women Candidates

Submitted: Boston Globe, not published

There is a very obvious one -- unfortunately, she is a Republican.
I would not be at all surprised to see a "September Surprise." In late September, Dick Cheney resigns for health reasons. George W. Bush taps Condoleezza Rice to be his running mate. Women and African-Americans then overwhelmingly vote Republican in the November elections.

slanting Science

Submitted: Boston Globe, but not published

This administration besmirches everything it touches.
The general problem is that it is beset by group-think. We have seen the damage done by group-think in a number of domain: in the way in which intelligence about Iraq was used; in the failure to consider the appropriate number of troops needed to pacify Iraq, and in the decision to ignore the sensibilities of America's oldest allies.
We see a new instance of group-think in the administration's April ruling on American scientific representation to the World Health Organization (Globe Editorial, July 2). Only scientists who have been vetted for political correctness by the administration can serve on WHO committees and panels. Instead of allowing the WHO to choose the best scientists, the administration will put forward scientists who adhere to its political agendas on issues like AIDS prevention (mainly abstinence), women's reproductive health (no abortion under any circumstances), and pollution (nothing that will constrain the production of greenhouse gases).
Here we see the administration trying to knobble the expert panels that decide on scientific policy by appointing members with an administration perspective to those panels. I see no problem in the administration pushing strongly for its values in its evidence to these panels (as long as the science is not distorted in the process). I see great benefit from the confrontation of conflicting value positions. I see major problems in appointing scientists with preconceived positions to the panels. World Health will suffer from the administration's passionate embrace of group-think.

Privatization's Dirty Little Secret

Submitted to Boston Globe

According to NBC news late last year, "Pentagon inspections of mess halls run by KBR are finding a mess in some of them... In the main Baghdad dining facility where President Bush surprised the troops on Thanksgiving, inspectors found filthy kitchen conditions in each of the three previous months. Complaints filed in August, September and again October report problems. Blood all over the floor of the refrigerators, dirty pans, dirty grills, dirty salad bars, rotting meats and vegetables. In October, the inspector writes that Halliburton's previous promises to fix the problems have not been followed through and warns the company serious repercussions may result, due to improper handling and serving of food." [NBC News, 12/12/03]
Is this the quality and efficiency that the proponents of privatization promised us? In the old days, a good hard-boiled Mess Sergeant would have got a mess like that cleaned up in a day or so -- and the whole crew would have been on extra detail until the kitchen equipment shone like the Excalibur sword.
It seems that we have lost a great deal with the privatization of the military's support functions to the likes of Halliburton who obviously do not care about doing a good job. It is unconscionable that coalition troops should be at risk from food poisoning as well as the insurgents' attacks.
P.S.
In his youth, the author served for four years in Britain's Territorial Army.

Accountability in Government

Accountability

Martin G. Evans

Professor Emeritus
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto

---

"We have the highest standards of accountability of any nation on earth."

Colin Powell (ABC, May 5^th 2002).
Colin Powell made this comment in the context of the US decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was also made right after comments about the US's role in setting up the War Crimes Tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. After the events of the past two years one wonders; one wonders to whom the standards apply.
When the comment was made, it was clear that Powell thought those standards applied to the United States as well as to other countries. That is why he thought the US did not have to join the ICC; it did not have to join the ICC because it was fully capable of policing itself and, more importantly, could be relied upon to police itself. Today it is less clear that the US has the will to police itself. It is less clear that the US has the courage to hold its top officials accountable for their errors and mistakes.
It is very clear that Donald Rumsfeld has a lot to answer for. Most recently he acknowledged that, on his orders, a person suspected of being a senior member of the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group was held for seven months without being registered as a prisoner, or enemy combatant, or even as a criminal. This failure to register prisoners is a direct contravention of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Furthermore, Rumsfeld has presided over a Defense Department that has, in many ways, violated the expectations the world has of how a civilized society deals with its enemies:

• Defense Department lawyers have submitted briefs suggesting that the Geneva Convention does not apply in the war on terrorism.
• Defense Department lawyers have pushed the boundaries of the behaviors allowed during interrogation so that activities commonly thought of as torture have been permitted.
• Up to now, the US Government and the Defense Department has dealt with the atrocities at Abu Ghraib prison in a purely hierarchical fashion:
• ignored the responsibilities of the Secretaries of Defense and War
• ignored the responsibilities of the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army Chief of Staff
• ignored the responsibilities of the senior Army commanders of Central Command and the Multi-National Forces, Iraq
• issued reprimands to low level officers who were, through their negligence, implicated in the atrocities
• are undertaking courts martial of the low level soldiers who are accused of carrying out the abusive activities.

That's military justice, but it isn't real justice.
Of course Donald Rumsfeld is not alone in this failure to take accountability for the activities of his subordinates. His boss, President George W. Bush, is equally culpable. He too has failed to hold America to its high standards. He has failed to adhere to the dictates of International Law. He and his co-conspirator, Dick Cheney, have lied about the link between Saddam and Al Quaeda. He and his whole administration have been very selective in their use of intelligence data in order to support the Iraq war that seems, in retrospect, to have been unnecessary:
We can and will call George Bush to account in November. But will George Bush call his Secretary of Defense to account before that?

Live by the Rules

Sent to Boston Globe but not published

The idea of allowing special elections to fill vacancies in state offices is a good one.
Unfortunately the bill is getting mixed up with day to day politics. It is expected and hoped by the Democrats on Beacon Hill that the first vacancy to occur will be the senate seat of John Kerry if he is elected President. Obviously the Governor and his fellow Republicans object.
I also think that people should live by the rules. I did not like it when the rules were bent to allow Frank Lautenberg to replace Robert Torricelli as Democratic candidate for senate in New Jersey. I don't like it if the rules change for Kerry and his fellow Democrats if he gets elected president.
There is a solution that will allow both Republicans and Democrats to support this important bill: The bill should not take effect until a week after the January 2005 inauguration day. That will allow the rules to be followed for the anticipated vacancy due to Kerry's expected resignation. It will also give a modicum of democracy back to the people for subsequent vacancies.

More Dots to Connect

More Dots to Connect.

Martin G. Evans
Professor Emeritus
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto.

Hindsight is wonderful. With every passing day some of the inexplicable actions of the Bush administration in its earliest days are beginning to come into focus. The rationale is becoming very clear: they all contribute to enabling the US to avoid accountability. Three sets of action confirm this reframing of the situation: the repudiation of the International Criminal Court; the US pressure to sign bilateral agreements with 50 countries to exclude US citizens from the rules of the ICC treaty; the failure of Attorney Haynes to fully discuss his role in developing the guidelines for treatment of prisoners under US control at his judicial nomination hearings for a seat on the 4th Circuit Court of Appeal (and, of course, his nomination for a seat on that court in the first place).
Consider the US withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. In May 2002, the US announced that it was withdrawing from the International Criminal Court. It claimed that the court would be controlled by unbridled prosecutorial zeal. It claimed that US citizens would be subject to politicized prosecutions (similar to the European show trials of the Vietnam War). If these assertions were true, there might be a case for standing aside. But the US got the elaborate procedural constraints that it wanted: the Court is complementary to national courts, only if national courts do nothing can the ICC intervene; investigations can proceed only after a pretrial hearing shows that there is reasonable cause; the UN Security Council can block proceedings. Secretary Powell (ABC, May 5th) claimed that adherence to the treaty was unnecessary: "We have the highest standards of accountability of any nation on earth." Today this statement rings hollow with courts martial being arranged for soldiers and wrist slaps for officers involved with the abuse at Abu Grahib; to say nothing of the lack of accountability for those in the higher echelons of government..
Consider the pressure the US has put on countries to sign bilateral arrangements with the United States to refrain from handing over US citizens, arrested in these countries, to the ICC. According to Human Rights First, at least 76 countries (1) have signed these bilateral agreements and over 20 others (2) lost their US financial aid because they did not sign. This reduction in aid will over time have severe impacts on US attempts to gain cooperation on the wars on terrorism, drugs, and the provision of peacekeeping forces around the world. All these were the beneficiaries of the US aid programs.
Consider the long line of judicial appointees who, when questioned at their confirmation hearings, failed to disclose their judicial thinking, a pattern that culminated most recently in the failure of the Pentagon's chief legal officer to discuss fully his role in the development of guidelines for the treatment of prisoners, enemy combatants, and other detainees. William Haynes appeared before the judiciary committee in November last year, well before the revelations of what went on at Abu Ghraib. At this time and in subsequent written questioning, according to Senator Richard Durbin (D-Illinois), Mr Haynes was "unresponsive" and "evasive" and failed to answer specific questions relevant to the US military's position with respect to the treatment of persons who were under detention (3). Mr Haynes, it appears, was one of those involved in making the argument that some form of torture was permissible in the case of detainees.
This pattern of activity by the administration, beginning in the early month's of its accession to power clearly shows a contempt for international law, a contempt for the Geneva Convention and an arrogance that is stupefying in its stupidity. All of these decisions will come back to haunt the United States as other groups and other nations start to play by the US rules. We will come to regret the day we turned our back on the world.

• 1. See http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/BIAsByRegion_current.pdf for a list of the countries which have signed bilateral agreements with the United States.(http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2003_alerts/0701a.htm).
• 2. See http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/BIAsByRegion_current.pdf for a list of those countries that have lost US aid because they refused to sign bilateral agreements exempting US citizens from the jurisdiction of the ICC. In addition some major US allies were exempted from the requirement.
• 3. See http://www.independentjudiciary.org/resources/resourcedoc.cfm?ResourceDocID=237 for Senator Durbin's statement in the Senate, May 10, 2004.

The Ignorance of George W. Bush

The Ignorance of George W. Bush

Martin G Evans

Professor Emeritus of Organizational Behaviour

Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto

M. G. Evans

48 Griswold Street

Cambridge

MA 02138

President Bush may have surrounded himself with some very smart advisors, but he cannot benefit fully from their advice because of his appalling ignorance -- an ignorance which gives him no grounds on which to challenge that advice. The past year has demonstrated in excruciating detail the ignorance of George W. Bush. His ignorance extends from the management of information to the management of prisons. I will describe the evidence for this charge.


Managerial Ignorance.

"I expect to get valid information . . . I can't

make good decisions unless I get valid information"

George W. Bush, April 13^, 2004.

George Bush's cry is echoed by every organizational manager in the world. Every manager would like to be sure that the information they received was both timely and accurate. Every good manager knows that it is his and her responsibility to make sure that the information received is timely and accurate. Despite his Yale education, George W. Bush did not learn this. Every good manager knows about the three major barriers to the realization of their mind's desire: self-serving subordinates, group think, and uncertainty absorption. Despite his Harvard Business School Education, George W. Bush did not learn this. Good managers are proactive to ensure that these barriers are overcome. Despite his years of management experience, George W. Bush did not learn this.


Self serving subordinates.


In organizations, information is power. By holding back information, an individual makes others dependent on him in their decision making processes. In other situations, where there is a major difference in the technical competence between a manager and a subordinate (so the boss is unaware that the wool is being pulled over his eyes), the subordinate can manipulate the flow of information so as to make sure the boss makes decisions that are consistent with the subordinate's best interests even though they may be sub-optimal for the organization. The classic description of this process was provided by Andrew Pettigrew many years ago in his graphic description of the power of an information gatekeeper in affecting the outcome of a strategic organizational decision (to make a major computer purchase). By carefully controlling the flow of information between a set of suppliers and the decision making body (the Company's Board of Directors), the gatekeeper ensured that 'his' supplier received the contract for the purchase. The gatekeeper used the following tactics:


a) Providing fulsome and timely replies to communications from the supplier that he favored, but only reluctant and tardy replies to communications from 'other' suppliers.


b) Refusing to visit or be "wined and dined" by the other suppliers.


C) Refusing to let his subordinate managers (each of whom favored a different supplier based upon their departmental interests; this was after all a multiparty political game) have direct access to the deliberations of the decision making body. The only exception to this was on an occasion when he knew that the most influential board member would be absent.


d) Providing a biased balance of positive and negative information about 'his' supplier and the other suppliers to the decision making body. He did this by diagnosing the 'assessed stature' (how good it looked in the eyes of the Board) of his department with the decision making body; he then passed information that he wanted to be believed when his stature was high (positive information about 'his' supplier, negative information about other suppliers), and he passed information that he wanted to be ignored or discounted (negative information about 'his' supplier, positive information about the others) when his department's stature was low. Note that over the whole decision period he provided balanced positive and negative information about each supplier. The imbalance lay in his strategic shifting of the balance of positive and negative information depending on how his bosses perceived him.


How can managers prevent being manipulated in this way? The first shield against this kind of manipulation is by being as technically well informed as the subordinate. This enables the manager to undertake his own evaluation of the adequacy of the information. However, this shield is rarely available in this world where problems are multifaceted and it is impossible for the manager to be an expert in each facet. The second, more proactive, technique is for the boss to reach down the hierarchy to gain information directly from the subordinate's own subordinates (and the suppliers) rather than having it filtered through the bottleneck of the subordinate's filtering mechanisms.


Further distortion by self-aggrandizing subordinates is the suppression of bad news or the inflation of good news. This tendency is increased when several subordinates are in competition for the support of the boss and when, as in this case, the boss has the power to decide the fate of those subordinates (in terms of budgetary outcomes). This is what appears to have happened in the famous August 6, 2001 PDB document. The seventy full field investigations claimed to be being undertaken by the FBI seem to have been rather less full and involved passive monitoring of suspects' financial affairs rather than their quotidian activities (like learning to fly). Again, a vigilant manager would look beyond the label "full field" and ask what exactly was being done, to whom, and why, and where. Tough questioning might have revealed how sham these "full field" investigations were with a consequent increase in surveillance of the suspects. Other things that can be done to minimize this tendency to inflate good news and suppress bad news is through the development of trust between the parties - the boss and each of the subordinates with each other.


Groupthink


The Bay of Pigs, the decision to bomb North Vietnam, and the Iranian adventure provide us with ample illustrations of Groupthink. This magnificently Orwellian term was coined by psychologist Irving Janis to refer to a group's inability to tolerate dissent, to a situation in which getting agreement around a solution becomes more important than developing the best solution.


President George W. Bush has yet to learn that tough action must be taken in order to prevent the domination of the forces of Groupthink. What does Groupthink look like? How would we recognize it in our own decision-making groups? Janis and earlier Norman Maier have identified a number of symptoms that we should be on guard against.


It is often difficult, because of the Groupthink phenomenon, for us to recognize when these symptoms occur in our own groups -- after all we know better, we would never make the same mistakes. That illustrates the first and greatest problem: the group believes that it is right; that it is right both factually and morally, and consequently the scenario of the operation {Bay of Pigs, Iran) will unfold as planned. This sense of invulnerability and moral correctness leads to four things that affect the group as it engages in the process of making a decision. First there exists a sense of unanimity within the group; everyone agrees on a plan. Indications of this are a failure to generate more than one or two alternative courses of action, and an individual's unwillingness to express his or her reservations -- individuals are their own self-censors. They suppress and keep to themselves their doubts and reservations about the plan. Often, many people share these reservations and the group lacks a true unanimity. In addition, members of the group put subtle pressure on those whose questions slip through the guard of their own self-censoring. As Janis observes, they do this by limiting the bounds of criticism to details of the plan rather than to its underlying assumptions and by isolating the dissenter into a slightly ridiculous role as in Lyndon Johnson's term for Bill Moyer: "Let's hear what Mr-Stop-the-Bombing has to say." Finally and most injuriously the group develops the MindGuards. These are the people who filter the information coming to the group. They make sure that outside information is suppressed or reinterpreted if it fails to support the cherished assumptions of the group. As a result of this process, the group makes its decision only upon information that is supportive of that decision. This builds up a self-fulfilling cycle of correctness. The illusion of rightness and unanimity is preserved; no disruptive questioning or information is admitted by the group.


These processes are pervasive in decision-making groups. One of the few ways of reducing their severity is to institutionalize dissent. Janis and Maier prescribe several mechanisms for doing this. They represent a reestablishment of the traditional American system of checks and balances in the political process.


A group should routinely make decisions in a two-stage process. First, critical evaluation should be suspended and a wide variety of alternative courses of action generated; the final list should consist of the offbeat as well as the obvious. This can be done by having several subgroups or individuals brainstorm lists of alternatives which are then brought back to the policy making group. In addition, group members should be encouraged to discuss the issues with their fellow workers and subordinates so as to bring a wider range of alternatives to the group's attention.


Second, each alternative should be criticized in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, with equal time given to both aspects. Work should be done on integrating several flawed solutions into a better one. This can be done by the leader of the group formally assigning the responsibilities of criticizing the alternatives to each group member. This alone is not enough; the leader must accept with good grace and an open mind the criticisms made about his ideas and proposals. Without this, all criticism will degenerate to a few pro forma comments. It is also helpful to augment the group, from time to time, with outside members who can bring a wider range of criticisms to bear upon the alternatives under consideration. These criticisms are apt to be less inhibited that those of the group members as they will have not built up any ownership of the alternatives under discussion.


Third, when the group is close to reaching a decision about the best alternative, the leader should appoint a Devil's Advocate for the two or three options that are under serious consideration. These individuals are to challenge the assumptions and expectations of the proponents of each alternative.


Finally, as a group approaches a final decision, it should be augmented by outsiders who have not been involved in the decision so far. These people will be able to bring to bear a wider variety of perspectives and their comments and criticisms will be less inhibited than those of group members as they will not have built up any ownership of the proposed solution.


At the last step -- once a decision has been taken -- the group should meet one more time to review doubts and challenge the correctness of the decision. We have all experienced what the French call "the bottom of the stairs" feeling when one remembers that critical comment that might have changed the course of a discussion. This "last chance" meeting gives us the opportunity to make that comment. It is like those Viking chiefs who used to make their decisions twice over: once when drunk and once when sober. If the two agreed they would carry out the decision; if they differed, they would think again.


These practices will not completely eliminate errors of judgement, nor will they guarantee success as even the best laid plans may go awry. These procedures will minimize the chance of failure due to overlooking possible alternatives or failing to consider the potential side-effects of the outcome selected.


Of course, the successful implementation of each of these safeguards depends critically upon the role of the group's leader. The leader must show that he or she values dissent and should provide a strong role model of the acceptance of critical comment. This means that the group leader should keep an open mind, be open to criticism, and not commit her or himself to a course of action until all the alternatives have been thoroughly explored. Can George Bush adhere to this self denying ordinance?


Uncertainty Absorption


The third prevalent source of information distortion in both interpersonal and organizational communication is uncertainty absorption. This occurs where raw data are summarized, aggregated, and edited prior to being transmitted onward. Two processes seem to be involved: the selection of data from the plethora of incoming stimuli; and the packaging of this data for transmission. In both processes, the monitor/communicator's frame of a reference or cognitive map is crucial in determining what information will be noticed and what information will be transmitted. In either process, information can either be suppressed, attenuated or enhanced.


It is clear that organizational position (functional specialty, staff/line, hierarchical level) affects the frame of reference that individuals use to scan their environments and incoming communication messages. These differences are found both in terms of the aspects of the environment attended to and in terms of the complexity of the individual's cognitive map. For example, higher level managers in both staff and line functions had higher cognitive complexity than those managers at lower levels; however, high-level staff managers were less complex (more single tracked) than their line counterparts.


The problem is that information congruent with a particular frame of reference is more easily noted or transmitted. When people with different frames of reference communicate, the receiver will distort the incoming information to fit her/his frame of reference. In organizations, different departments have different "funds of knowledge" and different "frames of reference." For example, R&D people are concerned with technical and, to a lesser extent, business issues; Marketing people were more balanced having almost equal concern with business issues, customer needs, selling and technical issues; However, managers in Manufacturing were mainly concerned with production issues and, to a lesser extent, technical. These different foci make it difficult to share insights. Deborah Dougherty found that successful product development only occurred when firms broke out of these habituated ways of thinking. Successful innovation resulted in someone, somehow ensuring that multiple frames of reference were considered. Only when issues and solutions were considered in these varieties of ways was success ensured.


Similarly, messages are transmitted up organizational hierarchies and each level has its own concerns: folk at the bottom are concerned with operational nitty-gritty issues; those in the middle worry about administrative issues. Thus information selected at the bottom for its operational relevance may be useless from a strategic perspective - especially after the middle managers have put their "administrative" spin on it. Furthermore, information that is relevant from a strategic perspective may never be noticed because it is irrelevant for operational purposes. The scandal of the Iraqi prisons exemplifies these processes very well. Those at the lowest level had no idea of (and no interest in) the strategic impact of their actions. They were interested in the softening up of the prisoners and had no foresight as to the strategic impact of their abuses of prisoners. Similarly, the investigations of the abuses took their time moving through middle management of the Pentagon. No one realized the urgency of the situation: the focus was solely on the judicial process rather than a joint focus on both the judicial and the political implications.
Uncertainty absorption is probably the most difficult for the organization, especially a large differentiated organization, to solve. It involves people in different divisions and at different levels taking the time and energy to understand the mind-sets of people in different positions in the organization. Presidents need to talk to operatives, Marketers to Researchers, and, in government, everyone needs to understand the political implications of what they do.


For each of these barriers to effective communication, Presidents and top managers need to be proactive. They need to actively explore frames of reference, they need to challenge the assumptions underlying the options that are proposed to them, and they need to get opinions from all parties affected by the decisions they make. Can George Bush change his incurious ways?




Ignorance of Life in Prison.


As Governor of Texas, George W. Bush was responsible for a large prison system - but it seems that only he and his Pentagon team were surprised by the abuse of prisoners in Iraq? No one else was surprised, since there have been prisons, there has been abuse of prisoners by prison guards. This was revealed most publically in the Stanford Prison Experiment of 1971 to the mistreatment of John Geoghan in Concord Prison two years ago.


In the Stanford Prison Experiment, Stanford students were randomly assigned to role play Guards and Prisoners. Each was outfitted in appropriate uniforms. The experiment had to be terminated after a few days because "guards" were mistreating "prisoners" and "prisoners" were experiencing psychological distress; fortunately short-lived. What is happening here is a common form of intergroup dynamics: a bonding with the in-group and a rejection of the out-group. This was coupled with two other things: the gross power imbalance between guards and prisoners and the dehumanizing effects of the uniforms so that people in both groups were not individuals, Joe, and Bill, and Alf - they were Prisoner 123, Guard 789, etc. Guards came to view the prisoners as lesser beings and therefore mistreating them was not the same as mistreating a human being.


These tendencies to devalue the "other" are of course even stronger in the case of Geoghan who was a convicted pedophile. These tendencies must also have been strong in Iraq where the prisoners' status as enemies, as Moslem, and as Iraqi all created differences between themselves and their captors. The dehumanizing effect was exacerbated by the hooding of the prisoners. Those hoods are not just to confuse the prisoners, but they are to ensure that the guards do not see them as individual human beings. With all those forces operating, it is no surprise that there was abuse.


What IS surprising, given all we know about the potential for abuse, is that the Army and others in the Administration did not take strong proactive measures to ensure that the abuse did not occur. After all, even the Bush Administration should have been able to foresee the explosive political and international effects that would occur if such abuse were to be revealed -- but perhaps not, given the uncertainty absorption process. Or perhaps it is not so surprising given this Administration's cavalier attitude to civil rights, to the Geneva Convention, and to the International Criminal Court - the Bush Administration's opposition to this Court makes sense in the light of all that has passed since March 2003.

In these two areas, Bush's ignorance has been politically devastating both domestically and internationally. The world's suspicions of the United States has been intensified by these major failures in policy. The Presidency is to important a job to learn by doing. Bush needs a rapid course in Management, given by disinterested experts, if the country is to stave off further mistakes. I doubt we shall see that happening so the country will lurch on from problem to problem. 

General Zinni's Disclosures

Sent to Boston Globe 

So General Anthony Zinni tells us that "everyone knew" General Shinseki was right when he said we needed 300,000 soldiers to pacify Iraq.
What a pity he and his colleagues didn't speak up before the war started. As we knew after the Bay of Pigs catastrophe, "groupthink" is a poor basis for decision making. If those leaders in the military had been doing their jobs properly, they would have spoken out. Then we might never have gone to war, or, if we had done so, we would have had sufficient troops to stabilize the situation right after the fall of Baghdad.
In any case, it is surely time for a new team, one with their ideas firmly rooted in reality, to take over the top leadership of the Pentagon.

Kerry Loses Touch

Sent to Boston Globe, not published

John F. Kerry seems to have lost touch with his most faithful constituency: the voters of Massachusetts.
His ruminations about delaying the acceptance of the nomination until long after the Boston Convention comes like a slap in the face to his most fervent supporters. Why are we to put up with road and rail closings, disruption of traffic, and heightened security controls? We were willing to put up with this at a proper convention where we would see our candidate rallying the troops for a major effort to oust the Bush administration. Without that rallying call from a true candidate, the convention will be a farce, and our discomfiture suffered for nothing.

Troop Rotation

Unpublished

I am not a supporter of the Iraq war, but many Americans are.
The support in this constituency will dwindle for two reasons: the on-going conflict in Iraq and the inept prosecution of the war. There is not a lot to do about the former except to soldier on; but the Administration can do a lot about the prosecution of the war.
The most inequitable feature of the way in which this war is being carried out is the way in which tours of duty are being extended -- often at short notice. This plays havoc with people's lives and with their family members' lives and, for those in the reserve, for their employers' plans. I cannot believe that there are no other troops available to rotate into Iraq to relieve the men and women who have served through the brunt of the war and the recent insurrection. I suspect that the reason for extending the duty tours of those currently in Iraq is that, like overtime, it is cheaper than deploying new troops.
It may be cheaper, but it is grossly unfair.
Many people say that Secretary Rumsfeld should stay in office because it would be a mistake to switch Defense Secretaries in mid-war. I think this is incorrect, his successor could scarcely do a worse job.

Crisis Management

Sent to but not published in Boston Globe

Secretary Rumsfeld seems not to have learned anything about crisis management. The smart thing to do is to get out ahead of the crisis and dominate the story.
Even today, the Secretary is allowing others to determine the pace at which revelations happen. There will be nothing worse for the administration if pictures of atrocities leak out in dribbles over the next few weeks.
Rumsfeld should release all the information and pictures and videos he has now. Get the furor over with in a couple of days rather than the "death by a thousand cuts" that will occur of the pictures are released over weeks or months. If there is concern for the privacy of the perpetrators then their faces could be fuzzed.
It is time Rumsfeld managed something right.

Abuses in Iraq

Sent to but not published in Boston Globe

The position taken by Joan Vennochi that the prisoner abuses in Iraq are the work of a few "bad apples" is becoming less and less sustainable as time passes. Today's revelation that, for the past few months, the Red Cross has been asking the US to stop prisoner abuse tells us that the "bad apples" are also to be found at higher levels of the military and political hierarchies.
The questions must be asked: when did the Secretaries of State and Defence know what was going on; when did the President know? If they didn't know, who was responsible for keeping this politically explosive information from them. If they didn't know, why didn't they make it their business to make sure that they got accurate and complete information about the situation in Iraq?

incentives for teachers

Why incentives for teachers are a bad idea. Teaching is an act of creation: the creation of a new, richer, improved cognitive structure in the mind of the pupil. This can occur through increasing the amount of information stored in that mind (such as learning the batting averages of a baseball player); it can occur through the generation of new connections among the pieces of information stored (like developing an understanding of the physics of the curve ball through a consideration of spin, velocity, and air conditions); most dramatically, it can occur through a radical reorganization of the pattern of connections (through understand how baseball is “not only a game” but is indelibly seared into the self identity of New Yorkers and Bostonians). Creativity in teaching is all about this process. The teacher needs to focus, in a series of one on one or one on many interactions, on the way in which her/his students learn. Unless the teacher focuses on this process, it will be hard for the teacher to adjust the teaching style to match the varied learning styles of the students. Financial incentives will disrupt this focus in two ways: incentives are given for irrelevant behaviors; incentives reduce the intrinsic motivation of the joy of teaching. What will incentives be given for? We now live in a world with teacher incentives: incentives for special training, incentives for higher degrees. This leads teachers into the pursuit of credentials, not, except incidentally, into better teaching. What then would be the criteria for “effective teaching?” There are two relatively simple criteria that might be used: Both are flawed. The first is to have students rate the teacher’s effectiveness, but this tends to develop into a popularity contest with teachers abandoning their professional responsibilities to do what most pleases the students. There is some evidence that higher ratings are associated with grading leniency, at least for average teachers. Another flaw is that teachers are judged relative to their peers. That is student’s mean ratings are anchored to the average level of teacher performance in the school. Even in a school with a superior level of teaching, a quarter of the teachers will be stigmatized as being in the bottom 25%. Similarly in a truly awful school, there will be teachers in the top 10% even if these would be at the bottom of the heap if they taught in a better school. The second criterion is to look at test scores, or at graduation rates, or at college placement. Although it can be argued that these are reasonable criteria that demonstrate the fruits of learning, good teaching is only one of the factors that lead to success. The quality of the intake is more critical, hence Harvard’s success. It is very difficult to control these factors to obtain an accurate assessment of the teacher’s contribution to the success of their students. A third criterion would be to look at the improvement in students over time. The problem here is that teachers will focus on those students in the middle of the pack who have both the capacity to improve and room to improve. They will be less likely to focus on those at the bottom of the class who may have difficulty learning, nor those at the top of the class who don’t need the teacher’s attention to each a relatively high standard of performance. It is hard to see how incentives for teachers will do anything to enhance the activity of teaching. Incentives are the anticipated outcomes for successfully reaching some level of performance; as such they focus attention on the outcome rather than on the process of reaching that outcome. Moreover they reduce or inhibit the intrinsic value of the work process. Students who work with incentivised teachers become means to ends rather than ends in themselves. The teacher worries about the student’s grades or the test scores result rather than on whether the student has learned anything. Incentives for teachers are an idea whose time should not come.

Prisoner Abuse

Why are we surprised at the abuse of prisoners in Iraq? We should not be. Since there were prisons, there has been abuse of prisoners. This was revealed most publically in the Stanford Prison Experiment of 1971 to the mistreatment of John Geoghan in Concord Prison two years ago. In the Stanford Prison Experiment, Stanford students were randomly assigned to role play Guards and Prisoners. Each were outfitted in appropriate uniforms. The experiment had to be terminated after a few days because “guards” were mistreating “prisoners” and “prisoners” were experiencing psychological distress; fortunately short-lived. What is happening here is a common form of inter-group dynamics: a bonding with the in-group and a rejection of the outgroup. This was coupled with two other things: the gross power imbalance between guards and prisoners and the de-humanizing effects of the uniforms so that people in both groups were not individuals, Joe, and Bill, and Alf – they were Prisoner 123, Guard 789, etc. Guards came to view the prisoners as lesser beings and therefore mistreating them was not the same as mistreating a human being. These tendencies to devalue the “other” are of course even stronger in the case of Geoghan who was a convicted pedophile. These tendencies must also have been strong in Iraq where the prisoners’ status as enemies, as Moslem, and as Iraqi all created differences between themselves and their captors. The dehumanizing effect was exacerbated by the hooding of the prisoners. Those hoods are not just to confuse the prisoners they are to ensure that the guards do not see them as individual human beings. With all those forces operating, it is no surprise that there was abuse. What IS surprising, given all we know about the potential for abuses is that the Army and others in the Administration did not take strong proactive measures to ensure that the abuse did not occur. After all, even the Bush Administration should have been able to foresee the explosive political and international effects that would occur if such abuse were to be revealed. Or perhaps it is not so surprising given this Administration’s cavalier attitude to civil rights, to the Geneva Convention, and to the International Criminal Court - the Bush Administration’s opposition to this Court makes sense in the light of all that has passed since March 2003.

Enemy Combatants' Rights

Sent to but not published in the Boston Globe

The Supreme Court is presently considering whether US Citizens who have been declared "enemy combatants" should have access to lawyers. In reaching a decision, its members should reflect on the information coming belatedly out of Iraq. In Iraq, prisoners, presumably genuine prisoners of war, held incommunicado have suffered torture. That terrible failure of US policy is a powerful argument in favor of a Supreme Court's ruling in favor of those seeking access to legal support.

Why Spiked

Sent to and not published by Boston Globe

It seems to me that "**" is just as offensive as "it" when positioned between "b" and "ch". So why did Bruce Tinsley get a pass, but Gary Trudeau get spiked? Offensiveness or politics?

Barriers to Accurate Information Gathering

Barriers to Accurate Information Gathering in Organizations [Including Governments]
Martin G Evans Professor Emeritus of Organizational Behaviour Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto M. G. Evans 48 Griswold Street Cambridge MA 02138

 “I expect to get valid information ... I can’t make good decisions unless I get valid information” George W. Bush, April 13th 2004.

George Bush’s cry is echoed by every organizational manager in the world. Every manager would like to be sure that the information they received was both timely and accurate. Every good manager knows that it is his and her responsibility to make sure that the information received is timely and accurate. Every good manager knows about the three major barriers to the realization of their heart’s desire: self-serving subordinates, group think, and uncertainty absorption. Good managers are proactive to ensure that these barriers are overcome. Self serving subordinates. In organizations, information is power. By holding back information, an individual makes others dependent on him in their decision making processes. In other situations, where there is a major difference in the technical competence between a manager and a subordinate (so the boss is unaware that the wool is being pulled over his eyes, the subordinate can manipulate the flow of information so as to make sure the boss makes decisions that are consistent with the subordinate’s best interests even though they may be sub-optimal for the organization. The classic description of this process was provided by Andrew Pettigrew many years ago in his graphic description of the power of an information gatekeeper in affecting the outcome of a strategic organizational decision (to make a major computer purchase). By carefully controlling the flow of information between a set of suppliers and the decision making body (the Company's Board of Directors), the gatekeeper ensured that 'his' supplier received the contract for the purchase. The gatekeeper used the following tactics: a) Providing fulsome and timely replies to communications from the supplier that he favored, but only reluctant and tardy replies to communications from 'other' suppliers. b) Refusing to visit or be "wined and dined" by the other suppliers. c) Refusing to let his subordinate managers (each of whom favored a different supplier based upon their departmental interests; this was after all a multi-party political game) have direct access to the deliberations of the decision making body. The only exception to this was on an occasion when he knew that the most influential board member would be absent. d) Providing a biassed balance of positive and negative information about 'his' supplier and the other suppliers to the decision making body. He did this by diagnosing the 'assessed stature' (how good it looked in the eyes of the Board) of his department with the decision making body; he then passed information that he wanted to be believed when his stature was high (positive information about 'his' supplier, negative information about other suppliers), and he passed information that he wanted to be ignored or discounted (negative information about 'his' supplier, positive information about the others) when his department's stature was low. Note that over the whole decision period he provided balanced positive and negative information about each supplier. The imbalance lay in his strategic shifting of the balance of positive and negative information depending on how his bosses perceived him. How can managers prevent being manipulated in this way? The first shield against this kind of manipulation is by being as technically well informed as the subordinate. This enables the manager to undertake his own evaluation of the adequacy of the information. However, this shield is rarely available in this world where problems are multifaceted and it is impossible for the manager to be an expert in each facet. The second, more proactive, technique is for the boss to reach down the hierarchy to gain information directly from the subordinate’s own subordinates (and the suppliers) rather than having it filtered through the bottleneck of the subordinate’s filtering mechanisms. Further distortion by self-aggrandizing subordinates is the suppression of bad news or the inflation of good news. This tendency is increased when several subordinates are in competition for the support of the boss and when, as in this case, the boss has the power to decide the fate of those subordinates (in terms of budgetary outcomes). This is what appears to have happened in the famous August 6 2001 PDB document. The seventy full field investigations claimed to be being undertaken by the FBI seem to have been rather less full and involved passive monitoring of suspects’ financial affairs rather than their quotidian activities (like learning to fly). Again, a vigilant manager would look beyond the label “full field” and ask what exactly was being done, to whom, and why, and where. Tough questioning might have revealed how sham these “full field” investigations were with a consequent increase in surveillance of the suspects. Other things that can be done to minimize this tendency to inflate good news and suppress bad news is through the development of trust between the parties – the boss and each of the subordinates with each other. Groupthink The Bay of Pigs, the decision to bomb North Vietnam, and the Iranian adventure provide us with ample illustrations of Groupthink. This magnificently Orwellian term was coined by psychologist Irving Janis to refer to a group's inability to tolerate dissent, to a situation in which getting agreement around a solution becomes more important than developing the best solution. President George W. Bush has yet to learn that tough action must be taken in order to prevent the domination of the forces of Groupthink. What does Groupthink look like? How would we recognize it in our own decision-making groups? Janis and earlier Norman Maier have identified a number of symptoms that we should be on guard against. It is often difficult, because of the Groupthink phenomenon, for us to recognize when these symptoms occur in our own groups -- after all we know better, we would never make the same mistakes. That illustrates the first and greatest problem: the group believes that it is right; that it is right both factually and morally, and consequently the scenario of the operation {Bay of Pigs, Iran) will unfold as planned. This sense of invulnerability and moral correctness leads to four things that affect the group as it engages in the process of making a decision. First there exists a sense of unanimity within the group; everyone agrees on a plan. Indications of this are a failure to generate more than one or two alternative courses of action, and an individual's unwillingness to express his or her reservations -- individuals are their own self-censors. They suppress and keep to themselves their doubts and reservations about the plan. Often, many people share these reservations and the group lacks a true unanimity. In addition, members of the group put subtle pressure on those whose questions slip through the guard of their own selfcensoring. As Janis observes they do this by limiting the bounds of criticism to details of the plan rather than to its underlying assumptions and by isolating the dissenter into a slightly ridiculous role as in Lyndon Johnson's term for Bill Meyers: "Let's hear what Mr-Stop-the-Bombing has to say". Finally and most injuriously the group develops the MindGuards. These are the people who filter the information coming to the group. They make sure that outside information is suppressed or reinterpreted if it fails to support the cherished assumptions of the group. As a result of this process, the group makes its decision only upon information that is supportive of that decision. This builds up a self-fulfilling cycle of correctness. The illusion of rightness and unanimity is preserved; no disruptive questioning or information is admitted by the group. These processes are pervasive in decision-making groups. One of the few ways of reducing their severity is to institutionalize dissent. Janis and Maier prescribe several mechanisms for doing this. They represent a re-establishment of the traditional American system of checks and balances in the political process. A group should routinely make decisions in a two stage process. First, critical evaluation should be suspended and a wide variety of alternative courses of action generated; the final list should consist of the off-beat as well as the obvious. This can be done by having several subgroups or individuals brainstorm lists of alternatives which are then brought back to the policy making group. In addition, group members should be encouraged to discuss the issues with their fellow workers and subordinates so as to bring a wider range of alternatives to the group's attention. Second, each alternative should be criticized in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, with equal time given to both aspects. Work should be done on integrating several flawed solutions into a better one. This can be done by the leader of the group formally assigning the responsibilities of criticizing the alternatives to each group member. This alone is not enough; the leader must accept with good grace and an open mind the criticisms made about his ideas and proposals. Without this, all criticism will degenerate to a few pro forma comments. It is also helpful to augment the group, from time to time, with outside members who can bring a wider range of criticisms to bear upon the alternatives under consideration. These criticisms are apt to be less inhibited that those of the group members as they will have not built up any ownership of the alternatives under discussion. Third, when the group is close to reaching a decision about the best alternative, the leader should appoint a Devil's Advocate for the two or three options that are under serious consideration. These individuals are to challenge the assumptions and expectations of the proponents of each alternative. Finally, as a group approaches a final decision, it should be augmented by outsiders who have not been involved in the decision so far. These people will be able to bring to bear a wider variety of perspectives and their comments and criticisms will be less inhibited than those of group members as they will not have built up any ownership of the proposed solution. At the last step -- once a decision has been taken -- the group should meet one more time to review doubts and challenge the correctness of the decision. We have all experienced what the French call "the bottom of the stairs" feeling when one remembers that critical comment that might have changed the course of a discussion. This “last chance” meeting gives us the opportunity to make that comment. It is like those Viking chiefs who used to make their decisions twice over: once when drunk and once when sober. If the two agreed they would carry out the decision; if they differed they would think again. These practices will not completely eliminate errors of judgement, nor will they guarantee success as even the best laid plans may go awry. These procedures will minimize the chance of failure due to overlooking possible alternatives or failing to consider the potential side-effects of the outcome selected. Of course, the successful implementation of each of these safeguards depends critically upon the role of the group's leader. The leader must show that he/she values dissent and should provide a strong role model of the acceptance of critical comment. This means that the group leader should keep an open mind, be open to criticism, and not commit her or himself to a course of action until all the alternatives have been thoroughly explored. Can George Bush adhere to this self denying ordinance? Uncertainty Absorption The third prevalent source of information distortion in both interpersonal and organizational communication is uncertainty absorption. This occurs where raw data are summarized, aggregated, and edited prior to being transmitted onward. Two processes seem to be involved: the selection of data from the plethora of incoming stimuli; and the packaging of this data for transmission. In both processes, the monitor/communicator's frame of reference or cognitive map is crucial in determining what information will be noticed and what information will be transmitted. In either process, information can either be suppressed, attenuated or enhanced. It is clear that organizational position (functional specialty, staff/line, hierarchical level) affects the frame of reference that individuals use to scan their environments and incoming communication messages. These differences are found both in terms of the aspects of the environment attended to and in terms of the complexity of the individual's cognitive map. For example, higher level managers in both staff and line functions had higher cognitive complexity than those managers at lower levels; however, high level staff managers were less complex (more single tracked) than their line counterparts. The problem is that information congruent with a particular frame of reference is more easily noted or transmitted. When people with different frames of reference communicate, the receiver will distort the incoming information to fit her/his frame of reference. In organizations, different departments have different "funds of knowledge" and different "frames of reference." For example, R&D people are concerned with technical and, to a lesser extent, business issues; Marketing people were more balanced having almost equal concern with business issues, customer needs, selling and technical issues; However, managers in Manufacturing were mainly concerned with production issues and, to a lesser extent, technical. These different foci make it difficult to share insights. Deborah Dougherty found that successful product development only occurred when firms broke out of these habituated ways of thinking. Successful innovation resulted in someone, somehow ensuring that multiple frames of reference were considered. Only when issues and solutions were considered in these varieties of ways was success ensured. Similarly, messages are transmitted up organizational hierarchies and each level has its own concerns: folk at the bottom are concerned with operational nitty-gritty issues; those in the middle worry about administrative issues. Thus information selected at the bottom for its operational relevance may be useless from a strategic perspective – especially after the middle managers have put their “administrative” spin on it. Furthermore, information that is relevant from a strategic perspective may never be noticed because it is irrelevant for operational purposes. The enhancing of information for strategic purposes is demonstrated by the use made by Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee in the run up to the Iraq war. In that case, an unsupported piece of information – that Hussein could deploy WMD at 45 minutes notice -- was bolstered to become a major plank in the British Government’s case for going to war. Chapter 6 of the Hutton report describes the process nicely (URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/03/hutton_inquiry/hutton_report/html/chapter06.stm#a34). Uncertainty absorption is probably the most difficult for the organization, especially a large differentiated organization, to solve. It involves people in different divisions and at different levels taking the time and energy to understand the mindsets of people in different positions in the organization. Presidents need to talk to operatives, Marketers to Researchers, and, in government, everyone needs to understand the political implications of what they do. For each of these barrier to effective communication, Presidents and top managers need to be proactive. They need to actively explore frames of reference, they need to challenge the assumptions underlying the options that are proposed to them, and they need to get opinions from all parties affected by the decisions they make. Can George Bush change his incurious ways?

Insulin: Boston and Toronto

Sent to and not published by Boston Globe Magazine; nor was any correction provided

No wonder Americans are so ill informed about the rest of the world.
In an article in Sunday's magazine about a young medical student, you said that he came to Boston where "insulin was introduced."
This gives the impression that Americans discovered, purified, and first treated diabetics with insulin.
Wrong!
This was the achievement of Banting, Best and Collip at the University of Toronto in Canada.
Please contribute to better informed Americans by publishing a correction next week.
Thank you.

Compensation in Organizations

838 words Compensation in Organizations: A Modest Proposal Martin G. Evans Professor Emeritus Rotman School of Management University of Toronto evans@rotman.utoronto.ca 617-876-3980 Martin G. Evans 48 Griswold Street Cambridge MA 02138

1 I think it is fair to say that we are approaching a crisis in capitalism similar to that at the end of the nineteenth century. At that time, major corporations were clearly being run for the benefit of their top managers (who were also usually their owners). The unparalleled greed by these beneficiaries led, in the near term to the trust-busting legislation of the first Roosevelt and in the longer term to the countervailing power of the Unions aided by the New Deal legislation of the second Roosevelt. Since the 1970's, we have seen the repeal or non-enforcement of anti-trust legislation and we have seen the collapse of the labor movement as a viable countervailing force. As a consequence, the compensation of the executive echelon (and especially the CEO) has risen from 40 times that of the average employee in the 1970's to over 400 times that of the average employee today. This change arises from two different trends: the inability of workers to capture much of the gains in productivity for themselves (this reduces the denominator in the CEO/employee pay ratio), and the practice of paying large bonuses (almost unrelated to performance; for example in the year that ATT lost $2.6 billion, the top management team gained $2.2 million in bonuses in addition to their regular salaries) to managers in order to attract or keep them in the firm. The collapse of union power has resulted in a Federal minimum wage that covers about 60% of poverty level wages for a family of four (a much lower percent in large, expensive urban centers such as Boston). The downsizing and outsourcing of the past decade has reduced the bargaining power of professional workers in the labor market. On the other hand, the labor market for CEO’s has stayed rather strong – this, as pointed out by David Levin, is because it is a rigged market. Prices are set, not by free market forces, but by a firm’s compensation committee which is often made up of other senior executives with an “arms length” relationship with the focal firm. They may be arms length in terms 2 of the firm’s competitors, but they are anything but arms length in the CEO market. They too are players in that game, so higher compensation for one means higher compensation for all! There is a second way in which the market has been rigged over the past five years: fraud. All those phantom profits in Enron, Qwest, and so on had as a consequence not-so-phantom bonuses to their executives. To “compete” in this rigged market for executives, other firms had to raise their compensation levels at the CEO and executive level. Even after the bursting of the economic bubble, we see little decline in the compensation of executives (in the past three years, the total cash compensation of the CEO of ATT has doubled from $2.2 million to $4.8 million; while the stock price almost halved). Over the past few years there have been attempts by stockholders to bring an end to excessive compensation, but this has been limited thus far in its success. What is needed is a change in climate, a change in the culture of best practice in organizations. The current culture since the downsizings of the late 1980's and early 1990's has been a view that top managers of a firm matter and that everyone else in the firm is dispensable. This attitude is exemplified by the enormous bonuses (in the range of 100%+ of salary) given to executives compared to the modest bonuses of 8% of salary given to employees. In an organization, everyone makes a contribution to the success of the organization. That contribution is of course greater for the CEO than for the janitor, or even for the research scientist at her bench. These differences in contribution can and should be reflected in different salaries: a living wage for the janitor and a good differential for the research scientist, and a large differential for the CEO. But when it comes to the bonus awarded for the firm’s performance, let equity reign. Let every member of the firm get the same percent bonus. Let everyone get 100% of salary or let everyone get 8% of salary. Reward differential contributions with different salary levels, but let the 3 bonuses be an equal percentage. If this were adopted as best practice by the best firms and by the powerful institutional shareholders, I believe that the excesses we see today would be banished. This is a stronger set of best practices than a simple goal to restrict CEO compensation as it provides clear links between CEO bonuses and employee bonuses. The adoption of such a best practice will not solve all of our problems with compensation excess. But it is a start that will, in turn, lead the looming crisis in capitalism to recede.

Misplaced Hyphen

It is not the most burning issue of our time, but you really should have human beings check the editorial page for felicity of expression.
I was put off reading the lead editorial by finding the following line split:
"... ille-
quipped..."
instead of the more proper:
"... ill-
equipped..."
>Surely you can do better!