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Showing posts with label abu ghraib. Show all posts
Showing posts with label abu ghraib. Show all posts

Monday, June 21, 2004

Accountability in Government

Accountability


Martin G. Evans


Professor Emeritus
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto



"We have the highest standards of accountability of any nation on earth."


Colin Powell (ABC, May 5th 2002).

Colin Powell made this comment in the context of the US decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was also made right after comments about the US's role in setting up the War Crimes Tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. After the events of the past two years one wonders; one wonders to whom the standards apply.
When the comment was made, it was clear that Powell thought those standards applied to the United States as well as to other countries. That is why he thought the US did not have to join the ICC; it did not have to join the ICC because it was fully capable of policing itself and, more importantly, could be relied upon to police itself. Today it is less clear that the US has the will to police itself. It is less clear that the US has the courage to hold its top officials accountable for their errors and mistakes.
It is very clear that Donald Rumsfeld has a lot to answer for. Most recently he acknowledged that, on his orders, a person suspected of being a senior member of the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group was held for seven months without being registered as a prisoner, or enemy combatant, or even as a criminal. This failure to register prisoners is a direct contravention of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Furthermore, Rumsfeld has presided over a Defense Department that has, in many ways, violated the expectations the world has of how a civilized society deals with its enemies:
  • Defense Department lawyers have submitted briefs suggesting that the Geneva Convention does not apply in the war on terrorism.
  • Defense Department lawyers have pushed the boundaries of the behaviors allowed during interrogation so that activities commonly thought of as torture have been permitted.
  • Up to now, the US Government and the Defense Department has dealt with the atrocities at Abu Ghraib prison in a purely hierarchical fashion:
    • ignored the responsibilities of the Secretaries of Defense and War
    • ignored the responsibilities of the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army Chief of Staff
    • ignored the responsibilities of the senior Army commanders of Central Command and the Multi-National Forces, Iraq
    • issued reprimands to low level officers who were, through their negligence, implicated in the atrocities
    • are undertaking courts martial of the low level soldiers who are accused of carrying out the abusive activities.
That's military justice, but it isn't real justice.
Of course Donald Rumsfeld is not alone in this failure to take accountability for the activities of his subordinates. His boss, President George W. Bush, is equally culpable. He too has failed to hold America to its high standards. He has failed to adhere to the dictates of International Law. He and his co-conspirator, Dick Cheney, have lied about the link between Saddam and Al Quaeda. He and his whole administration have been very selective in their use of intelligence data in order to support the Iraq war that seems, in retrospect, to have been unnecessary:
We can and will call George Bush to account in November. But will George Bush call his Secretary of Defense to account before that?

Thursday, May 6, 2004

Abuses in Iraq

Sent to but not published in Boston Globe

The position taken by Joan Vennochi that the prisoner abuses in Iraq are the work of a few "bad apples" is becoming less and less sustainable as time passes. Today's revelation that, for the past few months, the Red Cross has been asking the US to stop prisoner abuse tells us that the "bad apples" are also to be found at higher levels of the military and political hierarchies.
The questions must be asked: when did the Secretaries of State and Defence know what was going on; when did the President know? If they didn't know, who was responsible for keeping this politically explosive information from them. If they didn't know, why didn't they make it their business to make sure that they got accurate and complete information about the situation in Iraq?

Wednesday, May 5, 2004

Prisoner Abuse




Why are we surprised at the abuse of prisoners in Iraq? We should not be. Since there were prisons, there has been abuse of prisoners. This was revealed most publically in the Stanford Prison Experiment of 1971 to the mistreatment of John Geoghan in Concord Prison two years ago. In the Stanford Prison Experiment, Stanford students were randomly assigned to role play Guards and Prisoners. Each were outfitted in appropriate uniforms. The experiment had to be terminated after a few days because “guards” were mistreating “prisoners” and “prisoners” were experiencing psychological distress; fortunately short-lived. What is happening here is a common form of inter-group dynamics: a bonding with the in-group and a rejection of the outgroup. This was coupled with two other things: the gross power imbalance between guards and prisoners and the de-humanizing effects of the uniforms so that people in both groups were not individuals, Joe, and Bill, and Alf – they were Prisoner 123, Guard 789, etc. Guards came to view the prisoners as lesser beings and therefore mistreating them was not the same as mistreating a human being. These tendencies to devalue the “other” are of course even stronger in the case of Geoghan who was a convicted pedophile. These tendencies must also have been strong in Iraq where the prisoners’ status as enemies, as Moslem, and as Iraqi all created differences between themselves and their captors. The dehumanizing effect was exacerbated by the hooding of the prisoners. Those hoods are not just to confuse the prisoners they are to ensure that the guards do not see them as individual human beings. With all those forces operating, it is no surprise that there was abuse. What IS surprising, given all we know about the potential for abuses is that the Army and others in the Administration did not take strong proactive measures to ensure that the abuse did not occur. After all, even the Bush Administration should have been able to foresee the explosive political and international effects that would occur if such abuse were to be revealed. Or perhaps it is not so surprising given this Administration’s cavalier attitude to civil rights, to the Geneva Convention, and to the International Criminal Court - the Bush Administration’s opposition to this Court makes sense in the light of all that has passed since March 2003.